Häyry, M., Chadwick, R., Vilhjálmur, A. and Arnason, G. (eds.): 2007, *The Ethics and Governance of Human Genetic Databases. European Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 296 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-85662-1. Price: \$95.00.

Human genetic databases (HGDs) are collections of samples and data from large numbers of citizens that are being established in order to study interactions between genes and the environment and promise new insights for diseases and their treatments. The involvement of commercial companies and the risks to confidentiality of data and samples stored in HGDs have stirred considerable debate.

Iceland, Estonia, Sweden and the UK were among the first European countries to plan population-wide HGDs. From 2002 to 2004, the European Commission funded research on the Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Human Genetic Databases (ELSAGEN) in these four countries. The book provides an overview about the results of the various parts of this research. After a general reflection on American principles and European values, the first part summarises surveys of the public regarding concerns related to genetic databases. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks regulating HGDs in the four countries. Chapters on "ethical questions" and "political considerations" conclude the work.

Through the glasses of the public and the ELSAGEN team of these 4 countries, the wider European and international stakes are regularly targeted. Are countries "participating in an international 'gene race'" (Estonian newspaper, quoted p. 79 by P. Tammpuu)? Is a HGD "responsible biotechnology" (R. Kattel, p. 239)? Is the term "global public good" appropriate for HGDs, or are they mainly increasing the risk for indigenous people to be exploited (S. Wilson and R. Chadwick, p. 158)? Should HGD-legislation respond to concerns of the public or should it rather incorporate a more abstract viewpoint of "European justice" (M. Häyry and T. Takala, p. 256)?

The book is a very rich source to learn more about sociological, legal and ethical issues concerning the HGDs in the four countries. It is interesting to read that Icelanders, Estonians and Swedes seem to trust more in genetic science than the UK population. Since the methodologies used seemed to have been considerably different in the four countries, a more detailed description of the questionnaires used would have been helpful to understand such comparisons.

The book mirrors perhaps best the debate in that it oscillates considerably between optimism and pessimism. G. Arnason believes that the impact of HGDs is often exaggerated. "Science and medicine will also do very well without them" (p. 235). The legal analysis confirms that "governance structures for population genetic databases are not uniform or harmonious across Europe" (J. Kaye, p. 141). This demonstrates a "pressing need for governance reform, particularly vis-à-vis biosamples" (S.M.C. Gibbons, p. 140). "Trust" and "trustworthy institutions" are mentioned repeatedly in the book as a means to overcome difficulties related to consent and confidentiality. If "participants have good reasons to believe that they can trust the institutions which regulate the research, the people who work with the information and also the technical system which protects it, the issue of privacy should not be a major obstacle in the effort to balance participants' interests and scientific research interests" (V. Arnason, p. 5).

Is trust more than a "magic medicine" for the problems related to HGDs? M. Sutrop (p. 190f) urges that trust should not be blind, but authentic, i.e. based on knowledge and evaluation of risk, asking for guaranties and for trustworthy institutions that do not have conflicts of interests.

Wherever the future of HDGs lies, the book is an authentic contribution for the struggle to find adequate legal, ethical and socio-political solutions in Europe.

Bernice Elger

*Geneva, Switzerland*

Novak, D.: 2007, *The Sanctity of Human Life*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 186 pp. ISBN 978-1589011762. Price: \$34.95.

This short book contains three essays, based on public lectures, on the subjects of stem cell research, socialized medicine and assisted death to terminal patients. David Novak, a professor in Toronto University and a rabbi has published extensively on Jewish theology, applied ethics and bioethics. He is also the author of the entry on Judaism in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. A student of the Thomist Grisez, Novak has labored throughout his career on the reconstruction of "natural law" within Jewish ethics. Unsurprisingly, his positions in all three topics discussed in the book are in line with contemporary Catholic doctrines and are sometimes in stark discord with the positions held by virtually every rabbi specializing in bioethical problems, particularly on the "beginning of life" questions.

Novak is an original and courageous voice in Judaism. His argumentation is forceful, brilliantly articulated, well rounded, nuanced and compelling. Few other Jewish authors encompass such breadth and depth in theology, political theory, ethics and rabbinics altogether. It is a shame that his work has not been translated into Hebrew and is not known by other rabbis dealing with bioethical questions. Those familiar with rabbinic argumentations in favor of stem cell research cannot avoid appreciating Novak's counter arguments. Neither side is free from twists of exegesis and flawed logic. So why does the prevalent consensus in the rabbinic world differ so much from Novak's teachings?

Regrettably, Novak does not explore the moral and theological conviction behind contending rabbinic rulings, he merely dismisses them as based on excessive casuistry (pilpul) which is lacking in due regard for the gravity of human life (p. 42). This is unfair, even condescending. More troubling still are some of Novak's assertions, such as "abortion is still largely the recourse of persons who either did not practice birth control or whose birth control failed them" in the context of fornication (p. 70). This is a gross distortion of the facts known about women seeking elective abortion, particularly in poor societies.

Another disturbing example is his opinion that natural ethics is not possible for agnostics, whose only recourse is extreme legal positivism (p. 9). One would expect a philosophy professor in Toronto to know better.

If Novak had more respect for and curiosity in contemporary rabbinic ethics (let alone secular bioethics) and if those rabbis listen to Novak's deep, well thought and comprehensive reasoning, Jewish bioethics would benefit immensely.

This book is a must-read for any scholar of Jewish bioethics. Readers less familiar with the field who seek a map charting the waters of Jewish medical ethics and law are likely to be disappointed. Novak's words will lead them in fruitful and engaging directions, but the sails of all other rabbis have followed other winds.

Y. Michael Barilan

*Tel Aviv, Israel*

Ehm, S. and Schicktanz, S. (eds.): 2006, *Körper als Maß? Biomedizinische Eingriffe und ihre Auswirkungen auf Körper- und Identitätsverständnisse*. Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag. 254 pp. ISBN 3-7776-1382-7. Price: €12.50.

One of the central topics discussed in this collective volume is the assertion of the dominant role played by natural science when viewing the human body in the field of biomedicine. The various contributions describe the philosophical as well as theological, sociological, psychological and historical aspects behind the biomedical manipulation of the human body and its implications, providing ultimately the impression that the reductive-physical concept of the body is, for multiple reasons, insufficient in addressing the problems within biomedicine.

The first part of the book considers the topic of the "body as mirror" ("Körper als Spiegel") with contributions discussing, on the one hand, the (surgical) interventions on the human body, from which new, sometimes strange, even monstrous living beings develop (Stoff); while involving, on the other hand, what appears at first glance to be harmless interventions, such as attaching an artificial limb, which addresses the topic of socially integrating individuals with disabilities (Meuter). This topic is dealt with by other authors here, especially within the section on "Body as foreign substance" ("Körper als Fremdkörper"). Different diseases and disabilities, especially with regard to their various treatments, evoke, respectively, disparate reactions which in turn bring other, especially ethical, problems into play. In many cases, the subjective wish for "normalcy" bears such a degree of importance that it forces ethical problems easily to the margins of relevancy (Lundin). In cases involving neuroimplants for the hearing disabled, though, moral problems associated with transplantations do surface because as a social group, the hearing impaired have a strong form of self-identity (Bentele; see also Leach Scully).

In the section "Body as Issue" ("Körper als Streitfall") subjects dealt with in the first sections are once again re-explored, and, within the last contribution, are placed in a further ethical-philosophical framework, allowing the problem cases to be discussed from a broadening perspective (Schicktanz). It becomes clear that the natural scientifically technical view of the body is namely a valid, at times necessary, means for conceptualizing the human body. But in terms of ethical questions that arise from contact with the human body, other, anthropological and normative, considerations take on critical importance when making decisions in biomedicine. This can be convincingly demonstrated with the example of morally assessing the commercialization of the human body and its respective parts (Herrmann).

The images distributed throughout the entire volume from the film "Transposed Bodies/Fremdkörper" do not occur as simple illustrations, a point understood clearly through the accompanying texts. Certain contributions show clearly what the ramifications are in transplantations now made available, such as heart transplants (Decker) or limb transplants (Vogt et al.), and what serious effects these manipulations may have.

The revealing quality of the work presented here on biomedical interventions from differing perspectives and from varying concrete levels offers the reader a profound and at times surprisingly fresh insight into the problematic state of our body image that exists today and will most probably exist, in a more intensified form, in the future.

Uta Müller

*Tübingen, Germany*

Gesang, B.: 2007, *Perfektionierung des Menschen*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 176 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-019560-6. Price: €19.95.

Modern biomedicine presents a lot of tools to treat severe suffering and better up the quality of life of patients with a variety of diseases. However, many of these biomedical tools can be used---and some of them actually are used---off-label "beyond therapy" to augment and enhance the condition of medically healthy people. This has forced a long and ever enduring debate on ethical, legal and social aspects of this highly pressing issue.

Beginning with a chapter on ideas, methods, and limits of enhancement technologies like genetic engineering, implantable technological devices, psychopharmacology and different approaches to prolong the human lifespan, Bernward Gesang presents an ethical evaluation of enhancements in general based on his utilitarian position called "humane utilitarianism" (*humaner Utilitarismus*). Whereas the second chapter deals with the question what a future society of enhanced beings would be like, the third addresses individual risks of enhancement technologies. More general objections to enhancements based on human nature are critically evaluated and---not in every point convincingly---refused in chapter four. Finally the book closes with considerations on individual and social consequences of anti-aging. In the end the author gives a brief summary of his main conclusions on one single page presented as recommendations on the regulation of different kinds of enhancement.

Throughout the book Gesang presents several distinctions of possible enhancements. Although he holds that central enhancements are more problematic than liberal, mental more than bodily, and radical more than moderate ones, most of them are permissible, some even a duty to be provided and paid for by society. Some of the more problematic enhancements like radical bodily and moderate mental enhancements should be permissible only by a step by step procedure presented as a compromise between liberal and conservative argumentations. The only intrusions he wants to prohibit are those which will make a body unrecognizable as a human body and radical mental enhancements. With respect to children he has two further demands: the enhancement should be moderate and proven on adults. Parents have a duty to provide them with health-enhancements and anti-aging.

Confronted with these mere theoretical considerations on enhancements and the very liberal and permissive recommendations, the reader who wishes to know how this would work in concrete practice will miss an application of the recommendations to already available enhancement technologies. Confronting the---at least hypothetical, sometimes highly speculative---argumentations with actually pressing enhancement practices like doping practices in sports or cosmetic psychopharmacology based on off-label use of Ritalin or anti-depressants like Prozac would have provided the considerations with more persuasive power. So, in the end they unfortunately remain mere theoretical philosophical considerations on general futuristic enhancement-scenarios, which, however, is interesting enough. Footnotes instead of endnotes would have made the book more easily readable.

Overall, this affordable book offers to the interested and educated newcomer into the field of enhancement an introductory overview on some key ethical issues. Experts in this field of research are provided with a philosophical argumentation in favour of a liberal position presented in contrast to sketches of bio-conservative's criticisms of enhancement procedures.

Jens Clausen

*Tübingen, Germany*

Fagot-Largeault, A., Rahman, S. and Torres, J. M. (eds.): 2007, *The Influence of Genetics on Contemporary Thinking* (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 6). Dordrecht: Springer. 216 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4020-5663-5. Price: €127.99.

Imagine you have dinner in a new restaurant serving your favourite ethnic food. The waiter refuses to replace your stained tablecloth and serves you an eclectic combination of dishes of which some are ill-prepared; however, others are simply delicious. You feel that the meal is overpriced, but your frustration fades away when on the following day you find yourself indulging in the memory of the culinary highlights of the evening.

This edited volume might trigger similar feelings in those expecting a well-composed compilation of reflections on how genetics has influenced contemporary thinking about health and disease, or even more broadly, about human bodies, kinship, and sociality. Instead, we encounter a poorly edited collection of papers on various topics whose only commonality is that they touch upon genetics. Organized in three main sections: "Genetics and the Life Sciences"; "Genetics and the Philosophy of Science: The Reductionism Debate and Beyond"; and "Genetics and the Ethical, Legal and Sociological Debate", these contributions are more informative about what other disciplines have to say about genetics than how genetics has influenced other disciplines. In addition, some are so poorly written that they leave the reader longing for a stiff drink (see, for example, Koichiro Matsuno, p. 34: "The scheme of equating the successor to the predecessor is as a matter of course upon a metaphysical stipulation of concentrating only on synchronous interactions as dismissing sequential ones").

Nevertheless, those who keep reading will be rewarded. When judged upon their merit as stand-alone pieces some of the chapters are highly stimulating. For example, Jean-Yves Goffi's contribution on "The Harm of Being a Clone" adds original perspectives to a debate where one often feels that everything has been said already. Michel Morange's chapter on the role of genetics in defining life and death sheds light on a fascinating question which has not received much attention so far. Anne Fagot-Largeault's examination of whether DNA is "revolutionizing" medicine offers engaging reflections on what we really mean by the "geneticization" of science and society. Finally, some chapters in the second section of the book discuss the very timely insight that "molecular biology itself \[...\] has grown to challenge gene-centrism" (Speybroeck et al., p. 118). This, of course, poses the (unanswered) question of what will become of the field of genetics (as well as of books carrying the word in their title) when the "era of the gene" is over.

Barbara Prainsack

*London, UK*

Cameron, N., and Mitchell, M. E.: 2007, *Nanoscale: Issues and Perspectives for the Nano Century*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, ISBN: 978-0470084199. 488 pp. Price: €64.99.

This volume aims to offer an overview of the new issues posed by the nanoscale. The book consists of 24 contributions. The first part of the book covers a very broad range of questions connected with policy such as, for example, the challenges faced by insurance companies in dealing with nanorisks (Hett), the risks of nanoparticles (Balckwelder) and the problem of hype (Mitchell). Surprisingly, this section includes two contributions by transhumanists which are not immediately related to the specific topic of nanoscale: one is devoted to enhancement (Hughes) and the other to the general challenges of technological development (Bostrom).

The second part of the book analyzes the challenges posed by nanotechnologies for regulators and for the patenting process. Phelps states that the present European regulatory system needs partial modification and Kimbrell calls for a life-cycle approach for the analysis of the potential environmental hazards of nanotechnologies. Fender highlights the vibrant patent activity in this field.

The third part of the book takes into account the ethical challenges posed by nanomedical applications. Cameron's first contribution focuses on the general challenges posed by the nanoscale to an ethical reflection by arguing that nanoethics can be an opportunity to overcome some limitations of contemporary American bioethics. The other chapters of this section deal with specific questions emerging from the field of nanomedicine. Bennett-Woods analyses the general impact of nano in the health care sector, Hook focuses on the (legitimate) goals of medicine and Cheshire on future visions.

The fourth part is dedicated to societal issues. Mekel and Cameron offer an overview of the NELSI landscape, Weil discusses the challenges connected with the commercialization of products and Cameron suggests important points to be considered for policy makers, such as transparency and incorporating NELSI research into technological development.

This book offers a rich and diversified panorama of the major issues at stake, particularly perspectives of risk management (especially nanoparticles) and regulatory issues concerns. However, the analysis of the ethical and political challenges appears reductive. This is due to the special attention it gives to the challenges posed by nanomedicine, as if these were the only very specific ones, and the tendency to view the question of enhancement as the most important one. The book would have benefited if it had also explored general questions relating to the implicit views of nature and technology. Furthermore, important topics such as distributive justice and models of sustainability come up occasionally in the single contributions, but they are not systematically analyzed.

Arianna Ferrari

*Darmstadt, Germany*

Hamel, R. P. and Walter, J. J. (eds.): 2007, *Artificial Nutrition and Hydration and the Permanently Unconscious Patient. The Catholic Debate*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 294 pp. ISBN 9-781589-011786. Price: \$29.95.

The debate on the treatment of patients in permanent vegetative state (PVS) is certainly not new in bioethics: the first ethics committee was born in 1976 precisely to face the case of a patient in PVS (the famous Quinlan case). Since then, the matter has been object of innumerable interventions focused on the question: is it obligatory to continue the artificial nutrition and the hydration (ANH) in a patient in PVS? But this interrogation hides other more important issues: is the patient in PVS a dying or a serious disabled person? Is a life deprived of relational ability still a *personal* life?

This volume, edited by R. P. Hamel and J. J. Walter, is focused on this difficult issue and especially on the debate about the appropriateness (or not) of continuing the ANH in such patients. It should be noted that the book presents the debate on the issue from the Catholic theological and ethical perspective. After Part I, that contains the clinical information on the patient in PVS and on the ANH, the volume offers an analysis of the Catholic tradition and the debate on the so-called "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means (Part II). The Part III reports the interventions of the Catholic Church teaching and of the Catholic Bishops on the subject, while the Parts IV and V give space to the ethical and theological aspects and the analysis of the discourse held by the Pope John Paul II on March 20th 2004 on "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas". The Part VI faces the legal dimension through the analysis of two cases: a patient in PVS and a conscious patient but with a serious retardation.

As it can be deduced from a reading of the volume, the positions are not that uniform as they may seem at first glance. The editors emphasize the need for a dialogue to find the morally acceptable solutions, which is certainly not an easy task. This is because the central matter is not if the patient in PVS is a dying or a serious disabled person and if the NAH were obligatory. That the patient in PVS is a living person is more than evident: this is so true if we think that the inevitable consequence of ANH withdrawal is death. The central matter is, first of all, of anthropological nature: is there a difference between organic life and personal life? Is life an available good? These key questions have an influence on human dignity, on the quality of life and also on the qualification of the ANH as "therapy" or "care". The anthropological matter influences also two issues that need to be considered: is the incapability to have a relationship a limit of patients in PVS or of whom takes care of them? Is what we do for the patients in vegetative state, especially in terms of rehabilitation, really enough?

Maria Luisa Di Pietro

*Rome, Italy*

Quante, M.: 2007, *Person*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 224 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-018190-6. Price: €19.95.

This book is a welcome exception within the vast literature on the notions of person and personal identity. Quante offers a clear way of distinguishing and answering various questions that are all too often blurred. The book is thus valuable to readers seeking an introduction to these issues, but it also provides a helpful framework to experts on the topic.

Quante's book is structured around a distinction between three issues: (1) The first topic concerns the conditions of falling within the category of persons. (2) The second one is about the conditions for being precisely one person at a particular time and the same person over time (he calls them "unity conditions": *Einheitsbedingungen*). (3) Finally, there is a discussion on how to understand "identity" as an evaluative and normative relationship of a person to herself.Here Quante distinguishes between prescriptive and descriptive uses of the concept *person*. He argues that, by focusing exclusively on the descriptive use, we can avoid mistakes and unfruitful debates common in bioethics. Offering separately an account of the characteristics that make somebody a person in a descriptive sense brings more sharply into focus the question as to which characteristics of an individual are of ethical relevance.Against the background of a discussion of Locke and his critics, Quante offers a useful way of classifying the different positions. He then discusses in detail what he calls "the first-personal simple theory" (*die erstpersönlich-einfache Theorie*) and various "complex theories." He favors complex approaches---theories that offer a non-circular account of the conditions of diachronic unity. Such accounts formulate these conditions in purely causal or functional as opposed to evaluative and normative terms. In light of the problems of the theories he discusses, Quante suggests that---due to the evaluative character of the concept *person*---it may not be possible to state conditions for the unity of a *person*. Instead, he suggests we formulate unity conditions for a *human organism*. In this way, he argues, we can solve the difficulties plaguing other theories with respect to the question of unity.Quante's shift to the analysis of the unity of human organisms is part of an overall strategy. Some issues can be resolved in this way, other topics concern "identity" in a different sense and call for an analysis employing a normative and evaluative vocabulary. These latter themes he introduces through a critical discussion of Parfit's idea that "identity is not what matters." According to Quante, we can understand the unity conditions for a human person by focusing on the concept of a human organism, whereas the "identity" of a personality that a human being has can be understood in terms of the notion of a biographical coherence created and maintained through the person's own evaluative attitudes. Quante's book has moved the discussion forward. The critical attention it deserves is not possible within the confines of a brief literary notice.

Logi Gunnarsson

*Dortmund, Germany*

Steinberg, D. (ed.): 2007, *Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology*. Lebanon, N.H.: University Press of New England. 346 pp. ISBN 978-1584656432. Price: €34.99.

This is a somewhat unusual book in the sense that it gathers together about 115 contributions with the common feature of having been published in the *Lahey Clinic Journal of MedicalEthics.* The Lahey Clinic is in the Boston area, David Steinberg is its Chief, Section of Medical Ethics and the Editor of the above mentioned Journal, which began as a newsletter in 1994.

It is therefore not surprising if, out of the 97 authors, all but nine work in the U.S. (three are from China, three from Canada and three from other Western countries). The tenor of the treatment of bioethical themes or cases is therefore marked by the North American bioethics work of the last 30 years and the main tenets of the related prevalent doctrines---which of course does not rule out differences or disagreements among the authors. It should be noted that, often, a piece responds or comments on the one immediately preceding, with an occasional reply from the first author. Be it said also that, in the panel of authors, one finds a number of the North American stars in the field.

Excerpted from a periodical publication, the pieces gathered do not constitute a treatise or encyclopaedia aiming at covering, in a structured way, the whole field of biomedical ethics; the book is more of the nature of a reader. David Steinberg has arranged them in six parts: The nature of biomedical ethics, The power of language, Novel technologies, In the clinical arena, Ethics and the law (exploring facets of their always interesting interface), Ethics and the humanities, and has written an introduction for each of the first five parts. Part Six is made of the reviews of 15 books, one play and one film about ethical issues in the health field (life histories among others).

The collection includes contributions by such noted experts as Daniel Callahan, George Annas, Dan Brock, Bernard Gert, Daniel Dennett, Peter Singer, Alexander Capron, and Robert Veatch. The volume includes discussions of bioethical challenges in the clinical arena; ethical challenges associated with advances in biotechnology, genetics, and reproductive medicine; legal perspectives; physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia; health policy and distributive justice; the experience of illness, and many more critical issues. There are also contributions on cloning, transgenderism, enhancement, implantable chips and cybermedicine, as well as on somewhat exotic subjects like "Ethics for Astronauts" and "Bioethics in Space". Commentary on such issues from a broad range of perspectives adds to the book's richness, texture, and depth.

Most of the contributions count 3 to 4 pages and are easily perused. The language is clear and the reading agreeable, as well as the typographical presentation. The book is easy to consult: it includes a well-prepared index; there is a list of the affiliations of the numerous authors. Overall, interesting and substantial reading on the views of U.S. scholars and practitioners on issues of current interest in the large field of bioethics.

Jean Martin

*Echandens/Lausanne, Switzerland*

Becchi, P.: 2008, *Morte cerebrale e trapianto degli organi. Una questione di etica giuridica*. Brescia: Morcelliana. 200 pp. ISBN: 8837222408. Price: €12.50.

Paolo Becchi deals in this book with the debate on neurological criteria to determine death with the aim of presenting re-evaluations and criticisms of those criteria; he starts from the first official medical report published in 1968 by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, of the Harvard Medical School, and approaches the present day debate. The neurological criteria are applied when the determination of death has to cope with irremediable injured patients, in which brain lesions cause deep coma, unreceptivity, unresponsitivity, dependence on ventilator and flat EEG. In the years following the above mentioned report, those criteria became fundamental for obtaining organs to be transplanted.

The criteria were introduced in Italy for first time in 1969 by a decree disciplining organ procurement and transplantation; in 1993 a law was approved by the Italian Parliament, stating a legal definition of death as the cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including brain stem; such a definition is to be applied for all purposes of death declaration, independently of organ procurement and transplantation.

In Italy a critical debate on neurological criteria does not actually exist: only a small number of Italian scholars are informed that brain death criteria are under a deep international scrutiny since the early Nineties. Becchi explains the most significant reasons to re-think those criteria: there is a conspicuous number of clinical facts reported by several medical professionals who found impressive inconsistency between the definition and the tests for "brain death". Becchi also analyses the philosophical arguments against the purported equivalence between brain death and human death, and discusses them from different points of view, such as Hans Jonas's and Peter Singer's ones. The use of a "new definition of death" crafted for declaring the death of a patient before cardiopulmonary arrest is criticised because it is also conceived as an attempt to solve the problem of vital organs' procurement and transplantation.

In many cases actual medical experience supports philosophical statement that brain death is not the death of the organism. As an example, Becchi discusses evidence collected by the U.S. physicians, Robert Truog and James Fackler: while the definition speaks of the irreversible cessation of *all* brain functions, tests simply evaluated *some* of those functions. Thus, despite theoretical definitions, patients are declared dead when some brain functions are still present, such as: pituitary function, the neuro-hormonal control by hypophysis and hypothalamus, a weak electrical activity in some areas of the neocortex, spinal reflexes, some reactivity to external stimulation.

One more controversial point in discussing whole-brain death criteria is the neurological theory underlining their application. According to this theory, the brain is responsible of the integrative unity of the body, and without a functioning brain an organism would become a mere collection of organs without any co-ordinated activity. The U.S. neurologist Alan Shewmon, a former supporter of brain death criteria, criticised that approach when his clinical experience challenged the theory of the central integrator. Dealing with paediatric patients led Shewmon to the conclusion that important integrative functions, such as the respiratory one, do not depend on the brain itself: in many cases they keep on going even when the brain is damaged and health care assistance is provided by physicians. For this reason, in Shewmon's view the theory of the brain as the central integrator of the body does not give any adequate justification to brain death criteria for death determination.

Given all these problems and inconsistencies related to the concept of brain death, the same foundation of the clinical practice of organ transplantation is deeply endangered: brain death patients are not dead, and if so they cannot be used to obtain organs. Becchi starts a deep and serious discussion about conditions for obtaining organs for transplantation, and makes proposals in which such conditions are no longer dependent on neurological criteria.

This book deserves to be read by philosophers, lawyers, health care professionals and anyone engaged in organ procurement and transplantation.

Rosangela Barcaro

*Genoa, Italy*

Nussbaum, M.: 2006, *Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 487 pp. ISBN 978-0-674-01917-1. Price: \$35.00.

In this volume*,* Martha Nussbaum argues that a real social and global justice might guarantee: (1) justice to people with physical and mental disabilities; (2) justice to all world citizens; and (3) justice to non-human animals. But actual contractarian theories of justice show limitations exactly regarding these three issues. Her *capabilities approach* offers insights, which are "superior to those suggested \[...\] by the social contract tradition" (p. 5).

In the following, I focus on Nussbaum's treatment of the first point, which she discusses by reference to Rawls' theory. She distinguishes classical contractarian theories based on the promotion of the own interests through the guarantee of reciprocal advantages on the one hand, and contractarian theories based on the value of impartiality on the other hand. Both kinds of theories lead to the exclusion of disabled people. The capacities for cooperation and coercion of people with disabilities are too much limited and so are the advantages that are expected to be guaranteed by a contract. And persons with serious mental disabilities don't have the moral capacities for the recognition of impartiality.

Rawls' theory integrates elements of these two strains of thought and has both of the problems. Primary: individuals in the original position know they are "rough equals", i.e. they always have a minimum of mental and physical capacities. But disabled people don't count as "rough equals" and therefore it is not possible to recognize them as subjects of justice. Secondly: with the original position Rawls assumes a concept of person characterized by "two moral powers". But this excludes individuals with mental disabilities, who lack these powers.

Certainly the structural limits of his theory were not unknown to Rawls. A less transparent veil of ignorance, which excludes the knowledge about being disabled, would implicate to give up the concept of "primary goods", and thus would undermine the operability of the theory. Instead Rawls proposes to attend to the necessities of disabled people at the parliamentarian level. But this proposal is convincingly criticized by Nussbaum: in this way they are not being considered as primary subjects of justice. Disabled people don't just want to have *more* primary goods at their disposal. They want *other* goods, which enable them to achieve characteristic valuable human functioning, and in this way to be integrated in the society keeping their dignity. According to Nussbaum this kind of goods should be expressed as "capabilities". She offers a reworked list of them (pp. 76--78): "A decent society will organize public space, public education, and other relevant areas of public policy to support such lives and fully include them, giving the caregivers all the capabilities on our list, and the disabled as many of them, and as fully, as is possible" (p. 222). If the price for the achievement was giving up the full operability of the theory, it would be a price worth it to be paid to accomplish the liberal promises related to an inclusive concept of citizenship.

The book is a valuable contribution to the discussion of global justice, although it presupposes a good knowledge of John Rawls's theory of justice. The discussion of disability is probably the strength of this volume. This is where Nussbaum takes her theory farthest with regard to the unresolved problems of social justice.

Daniel Loewe

*Tübingen, Germany*

Pfaff, D. W.: 2007, *The Neuroscience of Fair Play: Why We (Usually) Follow the Golden Rule*. Washington DC: Dana Press. 240 pp. ISBN: 978-1932594270. Price \$20.95.

There are at least two issues that are symptomatic for the current debate on the explanatory reach of neuroscientific research and practice, especially when it comes to communicating empirical data to the public: Firstly, the quite positivistic approach of neuroscientific endeavour to human traits and key features of moral decision making, an approach that normally is led by reductionistic models of explanation. Secondly, there is the ignorance of the metatheoretical assumptions, as much as of the general conditions of data generation and interpretation within the natural and the life sciences, which are both essential for the evaluation of neuroscientific knowledge.

Unfortunately, both shortcomings are prominently present in the book by Donald W. Pfaff, head of the Laboratory of Neurobiology and Behavior at Rockefeller University. The main theses of Pfaff′s book deal with describing how moral behavior, metaphorically speaking, "the Golden Rule" or some inherent capacity for fair play, may be a hardwired function of the human brain (chapter 1). This assumption, of course, is not quite as neat as it sounds. Pfaff undertakes to develop his theses along twelve chapters, beginning with a rough introduction into the history of ideas of social behavior, altruism and strategies of cooperation (chapter 2). He frankly refers to the neurobiologist's dream of "finding concrete, physical mechanisms underlying behavior"---starting with the thesis that "if the Golden Rule is so universal, the mechanism behind it must also be rather simple and dependable" (chapter 3). In the following chapters he describes fundamental mechanisms of the so-called neurobiology of fear, sex and parental love, sociability, the chemistry of aggression, as much as of interactions between environmental and genetic influences on emotions and temperament (chapters 3--11). Finally, Pfaff ambitiously comes up with the draft of "a new science of social behavior" (chapter 12), drawing also normative conclusions, which have to be seen as highly problematic from an ethical point of view. With reference to his theses, that "a prime candidate for a chemical turn on the brain's "ethical switch" for friendly behavior---is oxytocin" (p. 100), Pfaff claims not only to figure out how this specific hormone could ramped up to "promote friendly behaviors", but also to "reduce the effects of male sex hormones in some individuals" (p. 207).

Hence, this short literature notice is in some way a warning to all readers who are strongly interested in anthropological and ethical issues that per se transcend mere descriptions of neurobiological functioning.

Lara Huber

*Mainz, Germany*

Levy, N.: 2007, *Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 346 pp. ISBN 978-0521687263. Price: €42.99.

Neil Levy is right: the different forms of progress made in the sciences of the mind, including new knowledge and new options for intervention, will be among the philosophically most fascinating challenges for the 21st century. And he is right, as his book makes clear, that this progress is a challenge for philosophy in two respects---on a conceptual and on an ethical level. Furthermore I agree with Levy that the science of the mind will probably be the greatest challenge for philosophy on the conceptual level even if there will be other problems on the ethical level which will be more urgent and pressing (take questions of justice in a global world as one example). The reason why the sciences of the mind are likely to cause conceptual pressure both on our self-conception embedded in the manifest image and on our philosophical theories concern the mental, personal identity, autonomy or responsibility is that erosions of our self-understanding as agents, subjects of mental states and persons comes much closer to the heart of what we care about most and what we essentially are.

Levy's book is very useful for readers who want to find a first way through all these emerging problems in this new field since Levy gives a well informed and detailed overview of most of the relevant questions. And it will be helpful for those more familiar with debates concerning neuroethics since Levy analyses some of the most deeply rooted intuitions (both ethical and conceptual ones) which very often end in misleading and implausible ethical judgements. Levy's overall strategy is to show that different options like neuro-enhancement, memory-intervention or mind reading cannot be shown to be ethically wrong simply because they are new options, or that they are intrinsically wrong so that it would be possible to argue against them categorically. No version of the therapy-enhancement-distinction is such that all forms of therapy are on the right side and all forms of enhancement are on the other. And, as Levy shows, no conception of authenticity is such that it allows banning intervention into or enhancing the mind generally. Furthermore he refutes all categorical objections referring to questions of justice by showing that all this can establish the need only to estimate the options one by one and carefully take into account the concrete aspects which might be sufficient to make the use of new technologies ethically wrong because the actual structure of one's society will lead to results violating demand of justice.

Most of the arguments Levy presents and the overall positions he defends are not new. But he presents them in their interconnections and in a clear style avoiding polemics as far as possible. Nowhere Levy is in danger to be seduced by vague future scenarios (neither as utopias nor as dystopias) and always he tries hard to give an objective assessment of the developments. Therefore Levy enables and encourages the reader to make up his own mind concerning this challenge of the 21st century.

Michael Quante

*Cologne, Germany*
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